Nature

THE NATURE OF HUMOR

Humor is a ubiquitous and complex phenomenon. People have pondered its nature and meaning at least since they were able to write. Humor has been analyzed at work (Meyer, 1997), at home (Lingon, 1996), in children (Sullivan, Winner, & Hopfield, 1995), and in the elderly (Richman, 1995). Different levels of analysis have included the individual (Zhang, 1996), group (Pollio & Bainum, 1983), organizations (Barsoux, 1996), and society (Preuschoft & van Hooff, 1997). There has been research on humor producers (Fisher & Fisher, 1981), humor appreciators (Lefcourt & Martin, 1986), the butts of jokes (Saper, 1991), and bystanders (Lundberg, 1969). Humor has been investigated as an aspect of public speaking (Finerman, 1997), especially for senior executives (Kushner, 1990) and politicians (Sergeant, 1997), and as a tool of subversion (Jenkins, 1994).

Research into humor specifically (Kruger, 1996) and its creation (Koestler, 1964) has been balanced with research into laughter (Holmes, 1996) and its effects (Graham, Papa, & Brooks, 1992). Theoretical discussions (Durant & Miller, 1988; Raskin, 1987) have been balanced with practical advice (Carter, 1989; McGhee, 1994; Sankey, 1998). Although most scholars attracted to this field tend to be in favor of humor, some have written about its dangers (Fitzgerald, 1988; Graf & Hemmasi, 1995; Hemmasi, Graf, & Russ, 1994; Kubie, 1971; Smeltzer & Leap, 1988).

There are some large and helpful bibliographies (Goldstein & McGhee, 1972a; Nilsen, 1993; Rutter, 1998). These should acquired or at least visited by anyone interested in this field of study. However, for all of this investigation, there is no general theory of humor or even an agreed definition.

Here is the entry in one dictionary under humor (Merrian-Webster, 1995).

1a) A normal functioning body semifluid or fluid.
1b) A secretion or a hormone that is an excitant of activity.

2a) A fluid or juice of an animal or plant.
2b) Characteristic or habitual disposition.
2c) An often temporary state of mind.
2d) A suddenly increasing inclination, whim.<

3a) That quality which appeals to a sense of the ludicrous.
3b) The mental faculty of appreciating the ludicrous.
3c) Something that is designed to be comical or amusing.

The first pair of meanings (1) refers to the medical use of the term humor to denote a bodily fluid such as aqueous humor. That meaning is only of historical importance to this discussion.

The word derives from the Latin umor meaning moisture or fluid. People are comprised largely of water and other fluids. In the Middle Ages, doctors theorized that people were comprised of four specific fluids that were referred to simply as "the humors." Having a good balance of these fluids was thought to lead to good temperament (good humor). Sanguine people (with an excess of red blood) were thought to be excessively confident and optimistic. Phlegmatic people (with an excess of white phlegm) were thought to be stolid, sluggish and inclined to be rather dull. Choleric people (with an excess of yellow bile) were thought to be fiery, hot-tempered, irascible, and vindictive (cranky babies are still called "cholicky"). Melancholy people (with too much black bile; a substance that doesn't really exist) were thought to be extremely dejected, and prone to both nightmares and protracted anger (McGhee, 1971, pp. 4, 5).

Because a balance of these humors was thought to be the source of good health and temperament, any attempt to put people into a good mood came to be known as "humoring" them. Later, any material that was used by a humorist to create good feelings came to known as humor. Thus the use of the word gradually evolved. At first, it referred to a physical substance inside the body. Then it came to refer to mood or temperament, which we would think of today as mental. Finally, it came to refer to the stimuli for humorous feelings, such as jokes and cartoons. Oddly enough, because of fashionable perspectives such as evolutionary psychology, physical explanations of complex behavior are once again in vogue. To this day, definitions of humor are bedeviled by this ambiguity about whether its essence is to be found in the stimulus itself or in our response to it (Chapman & Foot, 1976, p. 3).

The second set of dictionary meanings speaks of humor in a wide variety of senses: as a fluid (2a), as a disposition (2b), as a mood (2c) and as a whim (2d). It is not these senses of the word that are central to humor research. Humor research does not focus on whether people are in a good or foul mood (humor), but rather on how they got that way. It investigates funniness, as in "seeing the humor" in something (3a), the sense of humor (3b), and the stimuli or triggers for humor (3c).

Subjective versus Objective

Some writers have offered very subjective definitions of humor such as "that certain psychological state which tends to produce laughter" (Veatch, 1998). In an oft-quoted phrase from Love's Labour Lost, Shakespeare has Rosaline (a minor character, attending the princess) say, in passing, "A jest's popularity lies in the ear of him who hears it, never in the tongue of him who makes it." This phrase is often quoted in support of the view that humor is "in the eye of the beholder." Amy Carrell, a professor of English, seems to have taken this perspective. She has characterized humor (referring to jokes, specifically) as "that sense of amusement that is generated within the hearer or receiver of the joke text, if the joke is successful" (Carrell, 1997, p. 174).

Subjective definitions of humor are important because they drive home the point that only an observer (a mind) can recognize something as humorous. There is currently no instrument that can reliably detect humor by looking solely at neurological processes. In that sense, there is a subjective element to humor. However, definitions that locate the essence of humor wholly within an observer don't seem to agree with our common sense understanding of the word.

In a book of college humor, for example, one would expect to find a series of jokes and cartoons (stimuli) about college life. These stimuli would probably be categorized as humor (or at least "attempted" humor) even if no one found them funny. So the word humor, in that sense, is meant to signify humor stimuli. This goes against the above notion that humor is something that is merely "in" the beholder. There are other things in our common speech to suggest that we usually mean something objective when we speak of humor. Often we say that we can "see the humor" in something. If that sentence is to have any meaning, then there must be something (humorous) that we can find "in" the situation. In other words, there must be something there for us to discover.

Of course, I don't mean to make the silly argument that our speech creates that reality. I mean to say that we use the term "seeing the humor" in things to express some reality we have experienced. (Otherwise, why would we say that?) The fact that an observer is required in order to identify humor does not imply that the humor is somehow "just" subjective. Although an observer may be necessary to notice the color red, no one should mistakenly claim that the color red is merely subjective. The appropriate frequency range can easily be detected with a light frequency meter, and thus has quantifiable objective existence.

At the other extreme, humor can be defined very objectively such as "any message transmitted in action, speech, writing, images or music intended to produce a smile or a laugh" (Bremmer & Roodenburg, 1997). This is another common understanding of the meaning of the word humor and accords with the final (3c) meaning in the dictionary entry above. Victor Raskin, a professor of Linguistics, has characterized humor (again referring to jokes, specifically) in terms of text. He said that a joke has occurred when the text is compatible (in full or in part) with two different scripts, which are opposite in this particular discourse and which overlap (to some degree) in the text of the joke (Raskin, 1985, pp. 99, 108). Sometimes just the form of an utterance identifies it as humor (Attardo, 1994).

Objective definitions of humor are important because they drive home the point that observers do not laugh at anything and everything. In fact, most people (in a given culture) laugh at the same things, as evidenced by the existence of popular comedy. Just as the field of aesthetics challenges the notion that beauty is purely in the eye of the beholder, so the ability to train and prepare professional comedians and writers challenges the notion that humor is purely subjective. In that sense, objective definitions of humor have validity. However, definitions that locate the essence of humor wholly within the objective world seem to go too far.

Taking Raskin's characterization literally, it appears that a joke text delivered in a forest (with no observer) would count as an instance of humor, so long as it followed certain rules of construction. Indeed, computers have been programmed to create punning riddles (Binsted & Ritchie, 1997) using such rules. (After running these programs, a human judge is consulted to decide whether the results are funny.) The skill of the computer at providing funny puns is improving over time. Although there seems to be some validity in objective characterizations of humor, this understanding of its nature is so formal that one wonders what is uniquely human about the whole phenomenon.

Some definitions of humor strike more of a happy median. For example, James Beattie described humor as "the view of two or more inconsistent, unsuitable, or incongruous parts or circumstances, considered as united in one complex object or assemblage, or as acquiring a sort of mutual relation from the peculiar manner in which the mind takes notice of them" [emphasis added] (1778). This definition introduces the idea that a true understanding of humor can only be found by focusing on both the incongruity of the stimulus, and the perception process within an observer. Few people writing today have moved past this insight.

John Morreall, who has arguably done the most scholarly work that exists in the philosophy of humor, offers the simple definition that humor means "enjoying incongruity" (1989). Although there are critics of this definition (e.g., Martin, 1983), it is at once comprehensive and elegantly simple. It takes account of both the incongruity of the stimulus and the subjective participation of an observer. It also hints at the fact that an incongruity must seem safe and interesting to the observer if it is to be considered humorous.

Some definitions go even further to include broad situational factors. Howard Pollio proposed a field theory of humor that took into account such background factors as social relationships, safety to laugh, and expectations that could be violated. He wrote that the response of laughter was "neither a strictly intellectual nor emotional one; rather it is a total person response to the specifics of a particular contemporary situation." (Pollio, 1983, p. 215). The idea of a field or context theory has a legitimate pedigree (e.g., Lewin, Lippitt, & White, 1939), and is important because it drives home the point that humor is a complex phenomenon. However, there would be little point in adopting a definition of humor so complex that it could not be understood any better than the phenomenon itself. In my view, the point of a definition (or a model) is to clarify the situation, not to impress the reader with the theorist's ability to form and organize complex abstractions.

In general, definitions of humor seem to vary from the objective to the subjective, and from the simple to the complex. There is no agreed definition, and there may be more distinctions that we need to make before the phenomenon can be fully understood or even identified reliably.

Stimulus/Process/Laughter

The Ancients took laughter as their subject matter, not humor. This is understandable, since the Greek and Latin terms for humor only referred to body fluids. Although the behavioral phenomenon called laughter is related to humor, and almost certainly relevant to any study of humor, it cannot be equated with humor. There is a great difference between laughter and humor, even though some studies even today fail to distinguish properly between them.

Norm Holland marvels that the subtle mental event called humor can result in the "spasms in the cheeks and belly" called laughter (Holland, 1982: 10). Although much laughter is indeed humorous or mirthful laughter, much is not. Laughter can be triggered by nervousness, tickling, nitrous oxide, deference to a speaker (Giles & Oxford, 1970) or even as a default response to an emotion to which no other response seems appropriate (Zemach, 1959).

On the other hand, humor quite often exists without laughter. Before there can be laughter, people must "get the joke;" including both understanding the meaning of any humorous communication and "seeing the humor" in the incongruity or word play. Beyond "getting the joke" (figuring out the intended incongruity), they must also "like" the humor or find it amusing. Even if all of this occurs successfully, people still might not choose to laugh aloud for any number of reasons. The humor may be of the gentle sort, as found in Reader's Digest, that does not trigger belly laughs. The listener's mood may be subdued for a wide variety of reasons. The social context may be prohibitive of laughter in general, or laughing at certain types of humor. Clearly humor can and does occur without laughter, and laughter can and does occur without humor.

One can argue not only that laughter and humor cannot be equated, but also that they cannot be characterized in a simple stimulus-response relationship. Admittedly, when a baby is tickled, laughter is a fairly direct response to a stimulus. However, in most cases of humor, there seems to be an intervening phenomenon or mediator. Although it is once again fashionable to present the human being as an organism carrying out instructions from its brain, there is a more common-sense way to explain the humor process. For the moment, I will explain it in the way that makes common sense. Later I will introduce some theories that claim to challenge this process as nothing more than an imagined narrative.

FIGURE 1
Three-Legged Stool

STIMULUS -----> PROCESSING ----> LAUGHTER

The step called processing above rolls together several things. When we hear a joke, for example, we must somehow (a) figure out what the joker meant in the "set-up" line, (b) notice that the punch line doesn't seem to fit, and (c) figure out the funny way in which the punchline does sort-of fit. That part of the process is usually called "getting the joke." However, there is even more to it than that. We must also "like the joke." I imagine that each of us has heard a joke and been able to "see" the humor in it (we could explain the twist or incongruity that makes it funny to others), however we did not like the joke for one reason or another. It could have offended us, or seemed silly and childish, or too subtle to be very funny ... but, unless we somehow "enjoyed" the joke, there was no laughter response. Something in this process has to create mirth, because most everyone recognizes the connection between laughter and a good feeling (positive affect).

Some theorists would argue that the good feeling comes from "figuring out" the joke, and that the good feeling is then expressed as laugther. We call these theorists INC/RES, because they see laughter as an expression of the good feeling that results when we (RES) "resolve" an (INC) incongruity (i.e.,we figure out the joke). Needless to say, the inconguity of the situation is not really resolved just because the joke has been decoded. The punchline itself will be incongruous. However, the INC/RES theorist recognizes that "getting the joke" is a relief and even an accomplishment to be celebrated. Others kinds of theorists might argue that the good feeling comes directly from (as a result of) the laugther itself - because the laughter has vented stress due to the inconguity and thereby created relief. Regardless of this debate, where there is laughter there is pleasure.

In the above formulation, mirthful laughter is associated with humor while other laughter is not. Some authors would prefer the label "amusement" instead of mirth (Clark, 1987) and there is great debate about whether it is an emotion (Morreall, 1983; Sharpe, 1975). However, with the possible exception of B. F. Skinner, most people would agree that some processing occurs (deciding whether and how to respond to humor stimuli). Far from being a simple simulus-response transaction, the link between humor stimuli and the behavior of laughter is complex. We know this because even professional comedians are not able to guarantee a laugh.

This sort of distinction is very important. It helps us weed through the literature on humor, which has been characterized by confused and opinionated thought. Different writers address different topics (like so many blind men describing elephants) without any apparent awareness of this. It is quite amusing to watch humor researchers fiercely "debate" one another (attack other theories) as though they were offering competing theories, when in fact they are merely taking different perspectives. This field provides a rich opportunity for anyone who can bring together multiple perspectives without becoming hypnotized by any of them.

However, as important as these distinctions are (and they must never be forgotten), they are too simplistic to be left on their own. The model in Figure 1 ignores important peripheral aspects such as the context in which humor is experienced and the effects that laughter (or other mirthful expressions) can have.

Figure 2 presents a somewhat richer depiction of the phenomenon, which takes into account the inputs to and outputs of an instance of humor.

FIGURE 2
Considering the Context

CONTEXT ----> STIMULUS ----> PROCESS ----> LAUGHTER ----> EFFECTS

Even this depiction of humor is incomplete in two ways. First, the internal processing of a humor stimulus that may lead to mirth is neglected. As mentioned above, before responding positively to a humor stimulus, an observer must (a) understand what is being said, (b) "get" the unusual twist or incongruity that is being offered, and (c) enjoy it. The first stage relies on clear communication, intelligent listening, and sufficient shared context. The second stage relies on good delivery by the humorist and a sense of humor in the observer. The third stage relies on the receiver's mood and appreciation of humor. Of course, the first stage is a routine requirement of all communication that is not unique to humor, but the other two do seem to be specific to the phenomenon. For that reason, they should probably be spelled out in a characterization of humor.

The second way in which the figure is incomplete is that it presents the context as though it were a pre-existing and static element. In fact, the context is far more complex than this. Whenever a humor stimulus occurs in any setting, the context is changed by that stimulus. As people react to the stimulus in various ways, the context is changed once again. In fact, the effects that will ultimately ensue from any humorous event will be due as much to the context created as they will to the humor stimulus itself. Thus the context is really a grounding that underlies the entire model and changes fluidly as the model plays itself out.

FIGURE 3
Multiple Dynamic Contexts

(C1) >> Stimulus >> (C2) >> Cognitive/Emotional >> (C3) >> Laughter >> (C4)

In Figure 3, an attempt is made to address these issues. First there is a pre-existing context (C1), in which the humor stimulus must be understood and seen as funny. This is the shared understanding that is required, if the humor is to work correctly. Then there is a changed context (C2) due to the humor stimulus. Once someone makes a joke or otherwise introduces humor, the context is thereby changed. In this new context, two separate humor processes occur. First, the receiver does or does not "get the joke," shown in Figure 3 as a Cognitive processing. Second, the receiver does or does not "like the joke," shown in Figure 3 as Emotional processing.

It is a matter for the James-Lange versus Cannon-Baird debate in the discipline of psychology to consider whether finding something funny is an emotional response to a cognition, a cognitive rationalization of an emotion, or some combination of the two. However, the results of that processing (which may include mirth) will change the context again, creating C3. Depending on several factors in that context, the observer may or may not laugh or smile or express mirth in some other way. Whatever expression or non-expression of mirth occurs will again change the context, introducing C4 and completing the cycle for one instance of humor.

Quite often, this instance of humor will immediately instigate another one. The effects of that second instance of humor cannot be fully understood without acknowledging the cumulative effects of sequential instances of humor.

Recent research suggests that laughter may be more than just a simple expression of mirth. Robert Latta's process theory (1998), for example, and a recent collection of scientific notes by Robert Provine (2000), both develop the notion that laughter may play an more active part in the process of humor. Marvin Minsky (1984) suggests that humor is a protective mechanism to interrupt unproductive thinking. If so, then literally giving the body a shake through laughter may be an integral part of that process.

However, the above characterization is individualistic and ignores the involvement of other people. Although it will be argued later that humor is not necessarily a social event, and is really an individual phenomenon, it has to be granted that there are usually others involved in humorous interaction. Especially in the workplace, humor is most often interpersonal and it is very important to be aware of who is occupying what role in the process.

Humorous Interaction

Sigmund Freud noted that joking involved several participants. He assigned them roles and named them with terms that have been translated as raconteur, butt, and audience (Freud, 1928). Sven Svebak (1974) thought of this in a very similar way, using the labels humorist (for raconteur), target (for butt), and audience.

This sort of distinction was reflected in Craig Lundberg's four "analytical categories" of individuals involved in person-focused joking behavior (Lundberg, 1969). His first category was called the initiator (the one who tells the joke or points out the humorous situation). The second was called the target (the intended audience of the joke). The third was called the focus (the individual being ridiculed or suggested as funny). The final category was called publics (people who could observe or overhear the joking, but were not its intended receivers). All of these concepts are helpful in thinking about person-focused joking behavior and, after all, most humor is interpersonal.

Tom Dwyer started with a similar idea. He used the term "initiator" in the same way that Lundberg did, while defining "target" quite differently and introducing the term "audience." For Dwyer, the target was the person who was "the object of the laughter produced by the joke ... the object of the joke." (Dwyer, 1991). This seems to be the same entity referred to by Lundberg as the focus of the joke. Dwyer used the word audience to refer to the group that Lundberg called the target. He defined a joke as successful when an audience responded to the initiator with laughter. We can quibble about the requirement that there be laughter before identifying a joke as successful, but the general idea (that different roles must be played in order to get the job done) seems to be sound.

Using this multi-participant model of humorous interaction, Dwyer went on to apply Ted Caplow's (Caplow, 1968) triad theory. Dwyer argued that, in an important sense, an initiator and an audience enter into a coalition against the target. Using triad theory to predict who would align with whom, he was able to explain some of the power dimensions of joking relationships noted earlier by anthropologists (e.g., Radcliffe-Brown, 1940) and paved the way for future researchers looking at the ethics of humor in the workplace.

A Characterization of Humor

Pulling this research together, the following characterization of humor can be offered. As illustrated in Figure 4, humor seems to involve three elements: someone or something that is ridiculous or laughable (Target), someone who points this out (Initiator), and someone who agrees that it is funny (Appreciator).

FIGURE 4
A CHARACTERIZATION OF HUMOR

However, there are two issues to clarify. First, this characterization seems to (wrongly) suggest that no humor can occur unless there are three separate people involved. Second, it seems to (wrongly) suggest that it can only be applied to person-focused joking, in which a person serves as the Target of the humor, or the butt of the joke.

In fact, it is not necessary that there be three different persons involved. When people use self-effacing humor, they are serving as both the Initiator and the Target at the same time (ridiculing themselves). When people happily endure mild teasing from friends, they are serving as both the Target and the Appreciator at the same time (enjoying their own victimization). When people smile or laugh privately at some humorous observation they have made, they are acting as both the Initiator and Appreciator at the same time (enjoying themselves). In all of these examples, two people are sufficient to fulfill all the roles proposed above as being necessary for an instance of humor. Further, suppose someone who is all alone trips and spills some small items on the floor, finds it funny, and laughs aloud (enjoying their own folly). In this example, one person has been sufficient to fulfill all three of the roles proposed as necessary for humor. Thus the characterization in Figure 4 does not require that humor involve three people, or even that it be a social event at all.

On the second point, the role of the Target (butt, laughingstock, prey, patsy, fall guy, victim) of the humor need not be played by a person. Although superiority theory from the 17th Century (discussed below) suggests that we usually laugh at the infirmities of others, Bain (1888) extended that theory to offer the concept that we include ideas, political institutions, and inanimate objects as targets of ridicule (Keith-Spiegel, 1972, p. 7).

In fact, introspection suggests that this role is, in fact, rarely played by a person. In most cases the Target of the humor is not a person per se, but rather some laughable characteristic of that person. One might make fun of someone's pomposity, thrift, naivety, or large nose. One can rarely raise a laugh by simply mentioning a particular person. Thus clarified, the above characterization can be seen to apply to many types of humor, whether interpersonal or not.

So we have seen that the characterization of humorous interaction in Figure 4 is broad enough to include private humor and non-personal humor. But does that characterization represent the essentials of humor? Do all instances of humor include an Initiator, a Target, and an Appreciator?

It is proposed here that both a Target of humor and an amused Appreciator are essential to humor. When people are laughing at nothing at all (literally), we characterize their behavior as pathological. There must be some sort of Target of humor, even if we don't find it funny, before an event can count as an instance of humor. Thus a stimulus of some sort (the target of the humor) seems essential to the concept of humor.

What about an amused Appreciator? Can an incongruous event that occurs without any observer be considered an instance of humor? Arguably, one could formally identify incongruities in an event, without an observer having been on the scene at the time. (One could retroactively analyze text, for example.) However, one could not tell whether the audience found the event sufficiently incongruous to be noticed and yet not so incongruous as to be confusing or frightening. To know whether the event was funny at the time, one would have to consult the subjective response of an actual participant - an Appreciator. Thus it seems that both a Target and an Appreciator are essential for humor.

However, the Initiator may not be essential. One can notice a Target of humor and find it funny, without the intervention of any Initiator. As a matter of fact, in most cases, that is exactly how the Initiator experienced the humor in the first place. Although Initiators are ubiquitous in interpersonal humor, and are the ones who get credit for it, they do not seem essential to humor's existence.

There are also peripheral participants in humorous interaction. In the case of a staged performance, there is usually an unseen humor creator or Writer preparing the humor that the host or star seems to initiate (Fry Jr. & Allen, 1975). There are also Bystanders who may overhear the humor and be affected by it (for better or worse) even when they are not the intended audience. This is the group that Lundberg (1969) refers to as publics. In the special case of a workplace, there is also an Employer who reaps the rewards of any productivity gain from humor, and who pays the price for offense or any other problems that humor might create.

In summary, then, humor occurs when a stimulus successfully triggers mirth and may or may not elicit an expression such as laughter in a complex and changing context. It involves the participation of (at least) a Target and an Appreciator, and often involves an Initiator and others who may or may not be appreciative.

Now let's find out about the theories that have been offered to try and explain this phenomenon.